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1 Meeting in Baku in November 2009 between Patriarch Ilia II of the Orthodox Church of Georgia (left) and 
Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church (right). Third person in the picture is Metropolitan Gerasim of 
the Orthodox Church of Georgia. The meeting took place only a year after the Russian-Georgian war and both 
emphasized the strength of the relations between the two churches and the importance of restoration of the 
relations between the states and peoples of Russia and Georgia. In: Department of External Church Relations, 
‘Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church Meets with Catholicos Patriarch of All Georgia Iliya II’, 7 November 
2009, https://mospat.ru/en/2009/11/07/news8001/ (accessed on 03-07-2017).  
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Introduction 
 
‘Orthodox Christians have been killing each other!’2 exclaimed the Georgian Patriarch Ilia II after the 
start of the war in August 2008. The conflict between Russia and Georgia was the result of years of 
worsening relations and a strong disagreement about the two breakaway regions Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. In both Russia and Georgia the Orthodox church was an important factor in the 
development of the newly independent state and the national identity after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Both the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Orthodox Church of Georgia (OCG) 
supported the political stances of their respective states during the war. The OCG stated that 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are an inseparable part of Georgia, the ROC insisted that the Georgians 
started the war and Russia had the right to defend the Ossetians. However, this did not prevent both 
churches from stating their grief about the killings and their hopes for peace and reconciliation. This 
attitude led to the situation that when all diplomatic relations were broken off the Orthodox church 
was the only remaining diplomatic channel. 
 
This study will discuss the relations between Russia and Georgia and what the role was of the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Georgia between 2008 and 2013. 2008 will be 
the starting point for this research because that year the Russian-Georgian war broke out and the 
last meeting between the two presidents took place.3 Besides, it is most certainly the year with the 
worst relations between Russia and Georgia in post-Soviet history. The period ended in 2013 
because elections took place in Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili leaves office and Bidzina Ivanishvili 
became Prime Minister. He normalized the relations with Russia though maintaining a pro-Western 
course that focused on membership of EU and NATO.4 Relations between Russia and Georgia 
improved and a new meeting between the presidents of both countries was suggested, but never 
took place.5 The ROC and OCG were important agents in this process, especially because of the 
important influence both have in their own countries, their close alignment with the respective 
states and the fact that they were an important channel of diplomacy during this period. All in all, 
                                                            
2 Kishkovsky, Sophia, ‘Conflict Tests Ties Between the Georgian and Russian Orthodox Churches’, The New York 
Times, 5 September 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/06/world/europe/06orthodox.html (accessed 
on 25-05-2017). 
3 The Kremlin, ‘Beginning of Meeting with President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili’, 21 February 2008, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/page/229 (accessed on 26-05-2017).  
4 Rozin, Igor, ‘Russia’s relationship status with Georgia: It’s complicated’, 8 August 2013, Russia Direct, 
http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/russia’s-relationship-status-georgia-it’s-complicated (accessed on 26-
05-2017). 
5 Sushentsov, Andrey, ‘Limits of Normalization between Russia and Georgia’, Foreign Policy, 16 October 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.ru/en/analyses/limits-of-normalization-between-russia-and-georgia/ (accessed on 
26-05-2017). 
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the role of the ROC and the OCG on the relations between Russia and Georgia deserves a closer look.  
 
In this thesis I will conduct a case study to two different countries. What makes this case study 
relevant is that both Russia and Georgia are post-Soviet states where Orthodoxy gained a lot of 
influence after the fall of communism. The ROC and the OCG were and are connected as Orthodox 
churches and maintain good relations. Both maintain close relations with the political leaders in their 
country. The fact that war broke out between these two countries in 2008 makes it a unique case, 
especially since both churches supported their respective state but still maintained relations with 
each other. Studying this offers an excellent opportunity to achieve a better understanding of how 
state and church interact and cooperate in and between two different post-Soviet states. Since this 
conflict had a lot of impact worldwide, this is relevant, particularly because Georgia was applying for 
EU and NATO-membership made that the war was closely followed by the EU, NATO and their 
member states.  
 
In order to look further into what the role of the ROC and the OCG was, it is first necessary to look 
into the relations of Orthodox Churches and their respective states in general, to achieve a better 
view of the close but complex alliance between church and state in Orthodox countries. Only then it 
is possible to distinguish what tendencies and relations are typically Orthodox or unique in the case 
of Russia or Georgia. Consequently, it is necessary to investigate the relations between the different 
Orthodox churches and those between the ROC and OCG in specific. Furthermore I will analyse the 
position of the ROC in Russia and that of OCG in Georgia. The first chapter will be dedicated to this 
analysis. In the second chapter the function of these churches in this conflict will be discussed and 
the part the Orthodox churches played in the relations between Russia and Georgia between 2008 
and 2013 will be analysed.  
 
Hypothesis 
In this thesis I will make use of the following research question:  
What role did the Russian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Georgia play in the relations 
between Russia and Georgia between the 2008 war and the stabilisation of the relations in 2013?  
Using this question, I will be making a comparative analysis within a case study of the function of the 
Orthodox churches in two different countries and the influence on the relations between these 
countries. Based on studies like that of Daniele Kalkandjieva and others, I expect to encounter an 
entangled network of co-dependent actors: church, nation and state. Comparing these two 
countries during a conflict is a good way to gain more insight in this network. Kalkandjieva explains 
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the interaction between church and state in Orthodox countries as a symphony in which both 
partners cooperate and strengthen each other.6 That is, of course, the theoretical concept. In 
practice this relationship of symphony depends very much on the country, the church and various 
other factors. John Anderson argues that this symphony in the case of, on the one hand, Russia is 
very asymmetric and the state is far more influential than the church.7 In Georgia, on the other 
hand, the Patriarch is far more popular and influential than political leaders.8 A closer view is 
necessary to draw conclusions of how this works in Russia and Georgia. I expect that this 
relationship is not so much asymmetric as well as complex, because there is a lot of interaction 
between church and state on many different levels. This makes it also very interesting to analyse 
what happens when two Orthodox Churches, both closely aligned with the state as well as with each 
other, find themselves in a war between their states. Therefore this period between 2008 and 2013 
offers a good opportunity to analyse the relation between church and state in Russia and Georgia, 
the diplomatic relation between Russia and Georgia and the relation between the ROC and the OCG. 
  
Theory 
The political theory of Realism will inform and guide this study. Realism is a theory that is based on 
the idea that international relations is defined by different states having different interests. 
According to one source, quoted by the influential American scholar Hans Morgenthau, the absence 
of clashing interests is the only way two states could have an enduring bond.9 The reason for this is 
that relations between Russia and Georgia are dominated by political interests and spheres of 
influence. Or as Prime Minister of Russia Dmitri Medvedev calls them: spheres of privileged 
interests.10 One important interest for Russia is that it considers Russians living in the post-Soviet 
states as citizens of Russia and it therefore claims the right to protect them.11 At the same time 
                                                            
6 Kalkandjieva, Daniela, ‘A Comparative Analysis on Church-State Relations in Eastern Orthodoxy: Concepts, 
Models and Principles’, Journal of Church and State, 2011, vol. 53 (4), 587-614, 589. 
7 Anderson, John, ‘Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?’, Journal of International 
Affairs, Fall/Winter 2007, vol. 61 no. 1, 185-201, 195-196. 
8 Paroslavie.ru, ‘The Most Popular Person in Georgia is Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II’, 14 May 2015, 
http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/79408.htm (accessed on 26-05-2017). 
9 Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York 1948), 10.  
10 Trenin, Dmitri, ‘Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Inﬂuence’, The Washington Quarterly, October 2009, 3-22, 
4. 
11 This is repeatedly called a priority by Vladimir Putin in for example his speech after the incorporation of 
Crimea: The Washington Post, ‘Transcript: Putin says Russia will protect the rights of Russians abroad’, 18 
March 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-russia-will-protect-the-rights-of-
russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html?utm_term=.95162095fe68 
(accessed on 26-05-2017) and Dmitri Medvedev linked this element directly to the Russian-Georgian war when 
he said: ‘This is not a war between Russia and Georgia. This is the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, which we had to 
interfere in to force Georgia to stop killing people whom they view as their citizens and who at the same time 
were the citizens of Russia. This was an operation to restore the peace.’ (http://www.russia-
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Georgia has been wanting to become part of the big geopolitical alliance NATO to ensure its own 
security. This opposes Russia’s interests in the region, since Georgia’s accession to EU and NATO 
would make it much harder for Russia to exert power and influence over Georgia.  
 
Russia’s policies towards Georgia and the rest of the Near Abroad are strongly influenced by a 
realpolitik that is aimed at exerting as much power of the region as it can and preventing countries 
in the region from slipping to another geopolitical block.12 In 2008 the situation escalated, because 
several of these interests collided. First, there was the control over actual territory that is a fifth of 
the territory of Georgia, the self-established states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both requested to 
be part of Russia but this request was denied. According to international law these regions are part 
of Georgia and president Saakashvili tried to regain control over them. Russia saw this as a threat to 
the ethnic Russians living there and therefore as a threat to its interests. Finally the pro-Western 
policies of Georgia, applying for EU and NATO memberships was an important factor in the tensions 
between Russia and Georgia.  
 
Both the ROC and the OCG had and still have their own agenda, despite their traditional loyalty to 
the state. Both churches have been arguing strongly for the defence of traditional family values. In 
Georgia the OCG protested heavily when the government was shaping a law to ban discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, which was a requirement for Georgia to be 
granted a short-term visa-free regime by the EU.13 The ROC tried to push the same agenda and has 
had substantial success.14 It is nonetheless hard to distinguish where the agenda of the church stops 
and that of the state begins. A close analysis of this relationship is needed and will be conducted in 
this thesis.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
direct.org/analysis/russia%E2%80%99s-relationship-status-georgia-it%E2%80%99s-complicated based on: 
https://rg.ru/2013/08/05/premier.html, accessed on 03-07-2017). 
12 Waltz, Kenneth N., ‘NATO Expansion: A Realist’s View’ in: Ruchhaus, Robert W., Explaining NATO 
Enlargement, (Abingdon 2001), 31-32. 
13 Funke, Carolin, ‘The Georgian Orthodox Church and its Involvement in National Politics, 14 August 2014, 
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13023-the-georgian-orthodox-church-and-
its-involvement-in-national-politics.html (accessed on 22-05-2017). 
14 For example: the introduction of a ‘family flag’: Moodley, Kiran, Vladimir Putin's United Russia Party unveils 
'straight flag' to rival gay pride symbol, The Independent, 9 July 2015, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/vladimir-putins-united-russia-party-unveils-straight-flag-
to-rival-gay-pride-symbol-10377440.html (accessed on 23-05-2017) and a law banning ‘gay propaganda’: Elder, 
Miriam, ‘Russia passes law banning gay ‘propaganda’, The Guardian, 11 June 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/11/russia-law-banning-gay-propaganda (accessed on 23-05-
2017). 
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Methodology 
In order to answer the thesis question, this study will offer a comparative analysis within a case 
study of two countries. To be able to analyse the relationship between these two countries and two 
churches in this period, it is necessary to look at the primary and secondary literature sources about 
the 2008 war, relations between church and state in Orthodoxy and the relations between Georgia 
and Russia since 2008. More specifically I will use the following methods. I will draw literature 
sources from official documents and statements by church and state leaders to look at and analyse 
the position and the role of the ROC and the OCG during this conflict. I will also make use of existing 
interviews with these state and church leaders during this conflict and later. I will additionally look 
for primary sources in Russian and Georgian media, like Tass, Russia Today, Georgia Today and Civil 
Georgia. Finally, I will use opinion polls, because they offer valuable insights in the opinion the 
people and general tendencies in society. 
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The Orthodox Church and the Eastern Europe State 
 
In this chapter I will first go into the background of the Orthodox churches and their relationship 
with the state. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the relationship between the ROC and Russia, 
the OCG and Georgia and between the ROC and the OCG.  
 
The Orthodox Church is the largest traditional church in Christianity after the Roman Catholic Church 
(RCC). The former came to be in the Middle Ages when the Eastern part of the Catholic Church 
drifted apart which eventually led to the Great Schism of 1054.15 Nowadays the church has between 
200 and 300 million members around the world.16 The church is divided in 13 autocephalous17 
churches of which four are the ancient Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Jerusalem and 
Antioch. There are also five new patriarchates, those of Moscow, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Georgia. Finally, there are the churches in Greece, Poland, Albania and the Czech 
Republic/Slovakia.18 These latter ones all have an exclusive territory of jurisdiction and are equal,19 
though the Patriarch of Constantinople is based on the second and fourth of the ecumenical councils 
considered to be the first among equals.20  
 
The Hierarchy and Relations between the Orthodox Churches 
One large difference between the Orthodox church and the RCC is that in the Catholic church there 
is a clear primacy in authority of the Bishop of Rome. In the Orthodox Church the primacy lays with 
the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, but he does not have a formal authority over the other 
patriarchates within the Orthodox Church. Of these patriarchates, the ROC is generally 
acknowledged to be one of the most important and influential churches.21 This is largely due to its 
numerical dominance with 80 million members so being the largest church in Eastern Orthodoxy.22 
                                                            
15 Roudometof, Victor, ‘Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses and Institutional 
Disputes’, Sociology of Religion, 2008 (69:1), 67-91, 70. 
16 Roudometof, Victor, Globalization and Orthodox Christianity Today: The Transformation of a Religious 
Tradition, (New York 2014), 1. 
17 Autocephalous is a term used in Eastern Orthodoxy to describe a church that is able to elect its own head 
and is therefore independent from the other Orthodox churches. It’s based on the Greek word ‘αὐτοκεφαλία’ 
meaning ‘self-headed’. 
18 Curanović, Alicja, ‘The attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate towards other Orthodox churches’, State and 
Society, 20 november 2007 (35:4), 301-318, 302. 
19 Curanović,  302.  
20 Roudometof, ‘Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses and Institutional Disputes’,  
77. 
21 McGucking, John Anthony, The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to its History, Doctrine, and Spiritual 
Culture, (Chichester 2011), 47. 
22 Curanović, 306. 
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According to some this number is even as high as 160 million, but that takes into account the 
members of the ROC outside Russia.23 The position of the Ecumenical Patriarch is highly disputed 
among others by the ROC. And this theological dispute does have a practical dimension, which 
focuses on three issues: the jurisdiction, the right to mediate in disputes and representing the 
Orthodox Churches in the international arena.24 The ROC has been challenging the position of the 
Ecumenical Patriarch on these issues. In the 1990s the disagreement about jurisdiction has even led 
to a temporary schism in the 1990s when the Ecumenical Patriarch announced the resumption of 
Constantinople’s jurisdiction over the Orthodox Churches in Estonia. The ROC ceased prayers for the 
Ecumenical Patriarch (for the first time in 1000 years deliberately) in the Cathedral of the Epiphany 
in Moscow and suspended its ties with Constantinople. The conflict was resolved by letting each 
parish choose the jurisdiction it preferred.25 The ROC is very cautious about schismatic movements 
and has a reason to be so. The separation of the churches outside the territory of Russia would lead 
the ROC to lose 60% of its parishes.26 In general, therefore, the ROC does not recognise the other 
Orthodox churches aspiring autocephaly. Among these are the churches of Poland, Macedonia, 
Ukraine or Bulgaria.27 
 
Connections between Orthodox Churches and States 
Michael Radu, former Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, points at the strong 
links between the Orthodox Church and the national identity of a state.28 The Polish scholar Irena 
Borowik adds to this the traditional strong links with the state were a problem for the Orthodox 
church during communism. The church tended to be submissive and cooperate with the state, 
‘whatever the state might be’.29 Radu also writes that this led to collaboration with the state and 
during the rule of communism even with the leaders of the ROC being on the KGB’s payroll.30 
Daniela Kalkandjieva states that though the Orthodox churches have strong nationalistic tendencies, 
this does not mean they are inherently nationalistic. She argues rightly that in these two phenomena 
‘nationalism is a modern one, while Orthodoxy has a much longer history.’31 She does, however, 
point at the spread of phylethism in the nineteenth century, a concept that arose in Orthodoxy and 
                                                            
23 McGucking, 47. 
24 Curanović, 307. 
25 Davis, Nathanial, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church: Opportunity and Trouble’, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, vol. 29, no.3 (1996), 275-286, 279. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Borowik, Irena, ‘Orthodox Confronting the Collapse of Communism in Post-Soviet Countries’, Social 
Compass, 53 (2) 2006, 267-278, 274. 
28 Radu, Michael, ‘The Burden of Eastern Orthodoxy’, Religion in World Affairs, Spring 1998, 283-300, 290-292. 
29 Borowik, 269. 
30 Radu, 290-292. 
31 Kalkandjieva, 595. 
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means that every nation has the right to establish its own Orthodox Church. This idea came up in the 
age of nationalism and links church and state closer together. The condemnation of this concept by 
the Great Local Synod of Constantinople in 1872 did not stop its growing dominance.32 Victor 
Roudometof writes that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the membership of the 
church became equivalent with the membership of the nation and religious symbols like feast days 
were redefined and linked to nationalism.33 Alicja Curanović explains that this strong bond between 
church and state is traditionally caused by a common sphere of interest. This is partly a consequence 
of the relative freedom of Orthodox Patriarchates, being decentralized and equal to the other 
patriarchates. Kalkandjieva agrees with this and adds that the close bonds between church and state 
are rooted in the ecclesiastic structure of the Orthodox churches. Decentralization serves according 
to her as a condition for closer relationships with the state.34 According to Curanović as a 
consequence of acting on the same territory churches and states share some interests ‘which 
motivates them to cooperate in both domestic and foreign policy.’35 This concept is called symphony 
and is a very old Orthodox concept that ‘presupposes mutual penetration between the sacred and 
the civil, thus facilitating the cooperation between church and state in the Orthodox lands.’36 This 
concept of symphony results in a complex triad of state, church and nation which are all related and 
co-dependent. The church sees the nation as its ‘flock’ and has an agenda of making the nation as 
Orthodox as possible. That also reflects on the state, the church needs their support for achieving 
this. Orthodoxy is an important part of the national identity and the nation is part of the church. The 
state is Orthodox and can cooperate with the church and this can be a way to have impact on 
opinions and ideas of the nation. Because there is exchange between church, state and nation on 
many different levels it is hard to distinguish where the one stops and the other begins.  
 
The close cooperation between state and church led to the establishment of national Patriarchates 
in the new states on the Balkans and Eastern Europe.37 The independence of Ukraine in 1991 led to 
the belief that they should establish their own national Patriarchate as well, resulting in a split off of 
the Moscow Patriarchate and the coming to be of a Kyiv Patriarchate.38 Consequently, Ukraine tried 
to get the Kyiv Patriarchate recognised by the other Orthodox Patriarchates, an attempt that the 
Moscow Patriarchate unsurprisingly strongly opposed. The head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
                                                            
32 Kalkandjieva, 595-596. 
33 Roudometof, Victor, ‘Nationalism, Globalization, Eastern Orthodoxy: ‘Unthinking’ the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
in Southeastern Europe’, European Journal for Social Theory, 2 (2), 233-247, 240. 
34 Kalkandjieva, 600. 
35 Curanović, 302. 
36 Kalkandjieva, 589. 
37 Radu, 283-300.  
38 Davis, 277-278. 
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Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) was even excommunicated by the ROC.39 This idea is so strong in 
Orthodoxy that even breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia are claiming to have their own 
Patriarchates, though according to canon law they belong to the OCG. They tried to join the ROC, but 
were rejected and now claim their own Patriarchate with their own historical narrative.40 
 
The other side of the coin of division in the Orthodox Church is that these national churches played a 
large and important role in state building. This is also acknowledged by the states in the way in 
which they strongly support their own national churches or strive for the establishment of one. An 
example of how this nation building can work is in Georgia, where Ilia II when asked in an interview 
by CNN what his greatest accomplishment was answered to be of help in unifying Georgia after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.41 An achievement that was acknowledged by former president Mikheil 
Saakashvili when he praised the OCG in 2007 for its function as ‘a beacon’ for and ‘the driving force’ 
behind Georgia’s future renewal and reunification.42  
 
The ROC in the Near Abroad 
The idea that every country should have its own church is very strong in contemporary Orthodoxy, 
even though this behaviour was originally condemned.43 The largest exception to this rule is the 
ROC. The ROC covers large parts of the post-soviet area, except for Georgia. Therefore, the 
administration of the ROC has to deal with 13 neighbouring countries.44 These countries include 
Belarus, Ukraine45, Moldova and parts of Estonia.46 This can be problematic since the ROC maintains 
a close alliance with the Russian state. This leads, according to the Dutch scholar Marcel van Herpen, 
to the ROC being a very important soft power instrument of the Kremlin and working hand in hand 
with the Russian state in foreign policy.47 Daniel Payne writes that because of its close alignment, not 
only with the state, but also with the foreign ministry, the church has signalled to be united with the 
                                                            
39 Borowik, 274. 
40 Conroy, Kristina M., ‘Semi-Recognized States and Ambiguous Churches: The Orthodox Church in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia’, Journal of State and Church, vol. 57 no 4, 621-639, 628-633. 
41 Watson, Ivan, ‘Patriarch Ilia II: ‘Most trusted man in Georgia’, CNN, 26 April 2010,  
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/23/georgia.powerful.patriarch.ilia/ (accessed on 24-05-
2017). 
42 Civil Georgia, ‘Saakashvili Praises Georgian Orthodox Church’ 14 October 2007, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=16020 (accessed on 23-05-2017). 
43 Kalkandjieva, 595-596. 
44 Curanović, 303. 
45 Davis, 278. 
46 Radu, 298-299. 
47 Herpen, Marcel H. van, Putin’s Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy, (London 2016) 
136-138. 
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state in promoting the idea of a greater Russia.48 Kalkandjieva reflects on how problematic it can be 
when the concept of symphony is still prevailing, while the church is situated in a different country.49 
To gain more insight in this problem, I will briefly look at how the ROC functions in Belarus and 
Ukraine.  
 
Belarus 
In the 1990s there was a genuine hope that Russia and Belarus would evolve into one state, which 
led Patriarch Alexey II to personally bless the treaty on special cooperation between the two 
countries, the so-called Union State.50 It was also during that time that Lukashenka declared the ROC 
to be the official religion of Belarus.51 In the last few years Lukashenka has tried to assert Belarus’ 
independence from Moscow and searched for a closer alliance with other partners. Which has led to 
a very interesting balancing act in which some public rows between Russia and Belarus could be 
witnessed.52 One of Lukashenka’s intended partners is the RCC, which he showed by visiting the 
pope in 2016.53 According to the Belarusian analyst Siarhei Bohdan this tendency is a political choice 
that has been causing the ROC to lose believers in Belarus.54 Belarus is therefore an interesting 
example of how this relationship between church and state works. In Belarus this relationship does 
not work, because Belarus does not profit of the natural benefits a state church offers. The loyalty 
and support of the ROC does not strengthen Belarus, but is enhancing Russia’s influence in Belarus, 
because it’s first and foremost loyal to the Russian state. The interest for Lukashenka to support the 
ROC is for that reason almost non-existent, because a strong ROC in Belarus threatens the 
independence of Belarus and thereby also Lukashenka’s own position and influence.  
  
Ukraine 
Ukraine is another interesting example of a situation in which the influence and functioning of the 
Orthodox church is shown. In Ukraine, the Orthodox people tried to establish their own church in 
1918, but this attempt failed because of the lack of an independent nation state.55 A substantial part 
                                                            
48 Payne, Daniel P., ‘Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: 
Collaboration or Cooptation’, Journal of Church and State, 9 November 2010. 
49 Kalkandjieva, 607. 
50 Curanović, 306. 
51 Marples, David, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation, (New York 2012), 113. 
52 Waal, Thomas de, ‘A Belarusian Balancing Act’, Carnegie Europe, 20 February 2017, 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/68054?lang=en (accessed on 25-05-2017). 
53 Vatican Radio, ‘Pope Francis meets with President of Belarus’, 21 May 2016, 
http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2016/05/21/pope_francis_meets_with_president_of_belarus/1231492 
(accessed on 25-05-2017). 
54 Bohdan, Siarhei, ‘The Orthodox Church Is Losing Belarus’, Belarus Digest, 1 March 2012, 
(http://belarusdigest.com/story/orthodox-church-losing-belarus-8036, checked on 23-05-2017). 
55 Kalkandjieva, 607. 
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of the ROC in Ukraine established an autocephalous Ukrainian Patriarchate after the establishment 
of an independent Ukraine. Clergy and laity separated themselves from the Moscow Patriarchate 
and declared own local autocephalous church.56 This Kyiv Patriarchate is not recognised by the other 
Orthodox Patriarchates, in part because the ROC resisted its tendency to split off and claims that 
Ukraine still falls under the Moscow Patriarchate. There is however a third large church, mostly 
situated in Western Ukraine which is the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, also called the Uniates and this 
church submits to the authority of the RCC.57 The case of Ukraine shows the importance of having an 
own Orthodox church for an independent state and what a struggle it is to achieve that. The 
Orthodox church is important in particular since according to a 2014 poll 70% of the Ukrainians 
consider themselves Orthodox, the share of them being part of the Kyiv Patriarchate being slightly 
larger than those of the Moscow Patriarchate.58 A figure that probably changed in the advantage of 
the Kyiv Patriarchate since 2014. These cases of Ukraine and Belarus show two different states 
attempting tin various ways to deal with withstanding the influence of the ROC and asserting their 
own independence which shows how problematic this relationship between the Russian state and 
the ROC can be. 
 
The Position of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian Politics and Society 
Since the fall of communism the ROC has replaced communism as one of the main features of the 
identity of state and nation. This is not only shown by the spectacular growth of Orthodox believers, 
but also by the close alignment of the ROC with the state. The official reason president Putin used in 
the media for not being able to watch American president Donald Trump’s inauguration was that he 
had to be at an ice swimming event to celebrate the Orthodox feast of Epiphany.59 Aleksei Makarkin 
adds to this that the Patriarch is ‘the only religious figure in Russia that has direct access to the 
president’60 and at that point one can get an impression of how important the ROC has become in 
Russia.  
 
An interesting example in which the interaction between state and church can be seen is the 
                                                            
56 Kalkandjieva, 607. 
57 Radu, 286. 
58 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, ‘Ukraine-2014: Socio-Political Conflict and the Church: Positions of Religious 
Figures, Experts and Citizens’, 23.  
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documentary61 made by Fr. Tikhon, an influential monk that according to some is the confessor to 
Vladimir Putin.62 In this documentary Fr. Tikhon explains why the Byzantine Empire fell and in his 
view there are apparently a lot of similarities with contemporary Russia. He describes the problem of 
oligarchs and corruption, the betrayal of the country by opposition politicians and ‘the West’ that 
destroyed the empire by its politics aimed at financial and material power. He also argues that the 
Byzantine Empire was flourishing when they had a strong and centralized government. Towards the 
end of the documentary Fr. Tikhon states that the most important reason for the fall of Byzantium is 
that the Byzantine Empire lost its soul over the years. They forgot to worship God in the Orthodox 
way. This documentary is very loyal to and very positive about the state and the current 
government. But it also contains a warning for the state not to neglect the Orthodox church. The 
warm relationship between church and states is subsequently shown when the documentary is 
broadcasted three times on primetime Russian national TV.63 
 
The church already has gained a lot of influence in the post-Soviet era because of the increase of 
Orthodox believers in Russia since 1991. With 70-80% of the country identifying as Orthodox,64 
church representatives like priests and monks are not only nation-wide, but also locally and 
regionally important actors. Church leaders or representatives also have a personal influence that 
should not be underestimated. A 2016 study by the Levada Center, a Russian NGO that regularly 
conducts sociological research in Russia, showed that 71% of the people in general approved of the 
actions of Patriarch Kirill.65 According to another open question survey by the Levada Center, 
Patriarch Kirill is among the ten most trusted people in the country, even though only named by 3% 
of the respondents.66 Patriarch Kirill is a public figure and even has his own television programme.67 
By this he can exert a lot of influence on Russian society. At the same time should the influence of 
the presence of the ROC everywhere in Russia not be underestimated. Individual priests and monks 
are also important. Because it is unthinkable that an Archpriest in Kazan was able to get embroiled in 
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such a massive corruption scandal if he was not an influential regional figure.68 This shows that the 
church has extensive influence on all levels of society and is linked to both nation and state by a 
myriad of different connections. The importance of the ROC on society as a whole can therefore 
barely be exaggerated.  
 
Between the ROC and Russia one might well speak of the traditional symphony between church and 
state. And it is often hard to distinguish where the interests of the state stop and those of the church 
begin. The ROC has since long called for Russia to shift to traditional national-Orthodox values as 
opposed to Western liberal values.69 Anderson claims that there is indeed a congruence on the area 
of personal morality between the church and the state.70 This fits well in the idea of symphony 
between church and state, as the Greek sociologist Kokosalakis defines it: the Church provides the 
state with moral values and the state grants material support to the Church.71 According to 
Anderson this is a very asymmetric symphony. He argues that as long as the church plays a 
supportive role, the president is happy with giving it a privileged position.72 But according to him it is 
obvious that Putin is the dominant partner in the relationship.73 Anderson does, however, 
acknowledge the existence of a symphony, as he adds ‘the policies of Putin largely suit the 
leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, though in some there are differences of emphasis.’74 
This is a strong analysis, but it omits the exchange that is taking place all the time. Since the state 
considers itself Orthodox, state officials might not pursue policies the church opposes as they as part 
of the church oppose these ideas as well. Also, the influence of the church on policies in an earlier 
stage should not be underestimated. This happens not only by meeting state officials at various 
occasions, but also by state officials listening to a sermon or watching a television programme.  
 
The ROC is an important tool for Russia in foreign policy. It is especially in this sense that the ROC has 
an important role in ‘strengthening our Fatherland’ as Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov once 
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said in a press conference.75 The influence of the ROC on the Near Abroad is also very significant, 
especially in the countries to which its autocephaly reaches. Greg Simons, however, disagrees with 
the notion that the ROC would merely be a tool of the Kremlin and calls it an oversimplification.76 
The reason that the ROC often seems a tool of the state is also due to the fact that the ROC and 
Russia have a lot of common interests. A good example of this is the Ukraine, whose own Kyiv 
Patriarchate is threatening the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate. In this case as well Russia as 
the ROC have an interest in strengthening each other’s influence in Ukraine because church and 
state are connected. One particular point in which the state has a specific interest to use the church 
is in presenting itself as an international defender of traditional values as opposed to the liberal and 
individual values of the West. It is therefore not surprising that in his State of the Union speech in 
2013 Vladimir contently argued that ‘more and more people around the world are supporting 
Russia's defence of traditional values.’77 By promoting these values, the ROC can, especially in the 
Near Abroad, play a significant part in and strengthen Russia’s interests in the region. 
 
The Position of the Orthodox Church of Georgia in Georgian Politics and Society 
In Georgia the OCG has a crucial position in society. This is among other things shown by the 
confidence people have in the church. An opinion poll in 2014 showed that people trust the church 
over any other national institution, with a confidence rate of 94%.78 The leader of the church, 
Patriarch Ilia II, is the most trusted person in Georgia.79 Besides that he is by far the most popular 
person in Georgia, receiving 87% of the votes in a poll. Prime Minister Margvelashvili followed with 
52%.80 Another significant figure is that according to the 2014 General Population Census 83,4% of 
the Georgians identified as Orthodox.81 
 
The OCG has a lot of influence in Georgian politics, even though Ilia II announced the church does 
not interfere in political elections. Ansgar Jödicke argues that through sermons, meetings with 
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politicians and speaking out about political debates the church has a large political significance.82 
Carolin Funke describes a case when the OCG influenced elections and laws. To get the visa-free 
travel deal with the EU Georgia had to make a bill against discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity. The OCG opposed this and, according to Funke, made sure that the 
law, however approved, was inefficient in reaching its aims.83 A 2016 opinion poll showed that the 
OCG has a lot of influence on politics when 74% of the respondents said they would not vote for a 
party that is ‘seen as critical on the highly influential and increasingly more powerful OCG.’84 This 
same poll also asked if people would vote for parties said people have the right to speak about 
sexual orientation, to which 78% of the people answered they would not.85 Kristina Conroy confirms 
this, pointing at several occasions when the church publicly criticized the state. According to Conroy 
this shows some degree of separation between church and state, but it especially demonstrates the 
formidable esteem that the church has managed to gain in Georgian society.86 Finally, an interesting 
difference between the ROC and OCG is that the level of churchgoers in Georgia is among the 
highest (17% attends a church service weekly) in Eastern Europe, while in Russia it is among the 
lowest (6% attends a church service weekly).87 This confirms the notion that the relation between 
the ROC and Russia is a lot more complex and political, while in Georgia the church is very powerful 
and can influence politics strongly not only by getting involved in it, but also by releasing public 
statements with their views. The OCG is a much stronger independent political voice than the ROC, 
which is largely caused by the enormous respect it has gained in Georgia.  
 
The Relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Georgia 
The relations between the ROC and the OCG are of an interesting complexity. Both churches 
maintain close relationships with the state and supported the political stances of their state in the 
2008 war and on the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.88 Ilia II, patriarch of the OCG, has 
repeatedly criticised the ROC for its close alliance with the Russian state and especially with the role 
it plays in Georgia’s breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The OCG did not appreciate it 
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when Russian priests joined a military parade in 2005 in South Ossetia. South-Ossetia is not only the 
territory of Georgia, but also falls within the autocephaly of the OCG.89 The relations between the 
ROC and OCG are nevertheless close. A striking example of the proximity of these relations is that 
when Patriarch Alexei II died, only months after the Georgian-Russian war, Patriarch Ilia II visited his 
funeral in Moscow nonetheless.90 The relations between the ROC and the OCG are in general 
friendly, though Curanović describes this as a typical relationship between a stronger and a weaker 
partner.91 This relationship is a significant factor in the relations between Russia and Georgia 
between 2008 and 2013, which will be reviewed in the next chapter.  
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The Role of the Orthodox Church in Russian-Georgian Diplomacy  
 
In this chapter I will analyse the part the ROC and OCG played in the diplomacy and relations 
between Russia and Georgia. First I will give a brief introduction in the political relations between 
Russia and Georgia and consequently I will analyse the different ways both Orthodox churches have 
been involved in and exerted influence on the relations between Russia and Georgia.  
 
Since Georgia gained independence in 1991 relations have been tense with Russia, especially with 
regards to the breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia.92 The relationship worsened when 
Georgia wanted to move away from Russia’s sphere of influence, especially after pro-Western 
Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president in 2004.93 The conflict escalated end of July 2008 with the 
exchange of several bomb blasts and artillery fire. This resulted in serious fighting beginning of 
August and both Georgia and South Ossetia accusing each other of starting the conflict on 7 August. 
Georgia took large parts of South Ossetia which led to Russia retaliating the next day and 
reoccupying South Ossetia and on 11 August even capturing the city Gori, which was in undisputed 
Georgian territory.94 After five days of war a ceasefire agreement was reached by French president 
Sarkozy and signed on 15 August by Saakashvili and on 16 August by Medvedev.95 
 
The Relations between Russia and Georgia since 2008 
Before 2008, the relations between Russia and Georgia were tense, but in the period between 2008 
and 2013 relations are almost non-existent. Russia had recalled its ambassador in Tbilisi in October 
200696 but he returned a few months later when the relations improved.97 In November 2007 
Saakashvili called back the Georgian ambassador to Moscow, Irakli Chubinishvili98, he would soon 
return, but not for long because on 11 July 2008 he was called back again.99 Finally Georgia broke off 
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all diplomatic relations with Russia at the end of August and demanded Russia to withdraw their 
diplomats from Tbilisi beginning of September.100 Of course a minimum level of diplomacy remained. 
The consulates stayed ‘to ensure support for Russian and Georgian citizens respectively.’101 Besides, 
both countries started an interest section at the embassy of Switzerland in each other’s respective 
capitals.102 First direct talks between the countries took place on 14 December 2012 when the 
special representative of Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Abashidze and Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Grigory Karasin met in Switzerland.103 With this the relations normalised, but remained 
limited because Georgia has said not to restore relations fully until Russia recognises the territorial 
integrity of Georgia and stops recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.104 
Russia has at the same time been repeating that it is ready to normalizing relations with Georgia, but 
maintains its position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia.105 
 
Deteriorated Relations and the Role of the Church 
One could say that the relations between Russia and Georgia are at least frail. Interestingly the 
Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili was asked in 2010 by a Russian journalist if the 
recognition of the Circassian Genocide by Georgia would not further worsen relations with Russia. 
He replied: ‘Why, is there any further?’106 The relations between Russia and Georgia were at an all-
time low and one of the main reasons it did not get worse was that the ROC and the OCG ensured 
that some level of interaction always kept going on. Greg Simons argues for this positive factor the 
ROC and OCG were ‘at a time when secular politics and communication between the Georgian and 
Russian governments was virtually non-existent.’ Both churches ensured that indirect 
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communication between the governments continued through them.’107 When Patriarch Alexey II 
died in December 2008, only months after the war, Ilia II went to his funeral in Moscow and met 
president Medvedev there. Georgian President Saakashvili consequently praised him for what he 
called ‘a diplomatic mission.’108 He also said that the day before Ilia II departed to Moscow he had a 
conversation with him and discussed ‘a message, which the Patriarch had to convey to the Russian 
President.’109 So the Patriarch functioned here as an explicit channel of diplomacy. Another 
important element of this is that because both churches called from the start of the conflict for 
peace and reconciliation, (how hypocritical some might deem this because of their support for their 
respective states) there was no loss of face when meeting with officials from the other country, 
while for a politician it might have seemed he was giving in to the opposing country.  
 
Symbolic function 
Kristina Conroy emphasizes the positive influence of the ROC and OCG, despite their nationalist 
elements and their support to their governments’ political stances in the war. What was more 
important was that they both condemned the violence and protested against the warring of two 
Orthodox nations.110 And Conroy continues: ‘Their emphasis on Orthodox brotherhood makes it 
possible for them to work toward peace and reconciliation, even if their capacity to serve as peace 
builders has been handicapped by their national loyalties.’111 A good example of how the churches 
positioned themselves was showed when Patriarch Ilia II in an interview with Russia Today called it a 
large sin if Georgia would be divided. He also emphasized that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are part 
of Georgia. At the same time he emphasized the fraternal relations, the shared cultural heritage and 
his hope for improving relations.112 During the war both Ilia II and Alexey II called for peace and 
lamented this war between ‘people of the same faith’. 113 This focus on the brotherhood of 
Georgians, Ossetians and Russians makes sure their countries and people could not alienate each 
other completely. This means that, besides a geographical proximity, the countries also have a 
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cultural proximity. 
 
Calls for peace 
The ROC released an official statement on 3 September 2008 in which it supports the view of the 
Russian state by, on the one hand, emphasizing that ‘neither Russia nor the Ossetian people initiated 
the recent massive use of violence after years of relative peace in the conflict zone.’114 On the other 
hand, this statement shows that the church regretted the division of people of the same faith and 
urged to prevent anti-Georgian emotions in Russia.115In 2010 Patriarch Kirill planned a visit to 
Georgia to encourage closer relations between the two countries.116 A year later he claimed that the 
relations between the ROC and OCG helped improve the relations between Russia and Georgia.117 
Patriarch Ilia II did something similar when he spoke out against the independence of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia118 but also criticized Saakashvili for the war.119 Though this criticism did focus on the 
violence, it was clearly a call for peace and Ilia II is not someone that a person with ambition to be 
(re-)elected as president in Georgia would want to disagree with. 
 
The Question of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the ROC 
The ROC and the OCG had a difficult issue to resolve in this period. The regions of conflict, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, had requested to become part of the ROC. The ROC denied their request because 
it wanted to respect the borders of the other Orthodox churches. This viewpoint of the ROC was 
appreciated by Ilia II.120 According to Kristina Conroy this attitude of the ROC did not come from a 
pious respect for the autocephaly of the OCG, but more from a realist attitude. She writes: ‘Above 
all, the ROC wants to assert its primacy within the greater Orthodox community.’121 The OCG has an 
unusual position in the Orthodox churches, being much older than the ROC that goes back to 
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baptism of Vladimir in 988.122 The OCG is believed to date back to the fourth century when St. Nino 
converted the country to Christianity.123 Conroy explains that the ROC wants ‘to avoid a contest of 
authority with the Ecumenical Patriarch over South Ossetia and Abkhazia’,124 especially not against a 
church that is much older than the ROC. Besides, the chances of winning this contest would have 
been low for the ROC and this would probably harm its status. At the same time has the OCG 
showed not to be ready to give up Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Patriarch Ilia II conferred with the 
Ecumenical Patriarch in 2013 and declared after that to visit Abkhazia as ruler of its diocese.125 The 
American analyst Paul Goble has a different view on this. He claimed in November 2008 that the 
denial of the ROC to take control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia could lead to a worse relationship 
between church and state. He even went as far as saying that the ROC may lose its ‘privileged and 
hitherto unchallenged status as the Russian Federation’s religious representative to the international 
community.’126 Kimitaka Matsuzato argues that the ROC had absorbed Georgia before so that it 
would not be impossible to take control over these regions. The reason for not doing this, he says, is 
that the ROC would lose its legitimacy to criticize ‘violations of canonical law’, for example by the 
aforementioned Kyiv Patriarchate.127 Conroy quite rightly states: ‘Instead of annexation, the ROC 
(like the state) prefers de facto authority in this area, using friendly relationships between churches 
as a diplomatic channel.’128 It is clear that the ROC did not want to provoke the OCG by absorbing 
these regions, which from a diplomatic perspective was a positive influence on the relationship 
between the churches and thereby also between on the relations between Russia and Georgia. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Russian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Georgia have played an important role in 
the relations between Russia and Georgia. Church, state and nation are entangled in a complex 
myriad of exchange on many levels, in both countries. The Patriarchs of the churches are public 
persons, maintain good relationships with the leading figures of their country and both Patriarchs, 
but especially Ilia II are popular figures in their country. Nevertheless, it is hard to distinguish the 
power the church has over the state from the power the state has over the church. In Russia, it is 
highly unlikely that a documentary created by a monk, can be shown three times on national TV if 
this is not in the interest of the state. The Russian state also has a genuine interest in defending 
traditional values as a way to gain more influence of its Near Abroad. These values often gain a lot of 
support in the Orthodox countries in Eastern Europe. The relationship between church and state in 
Georgia might be even more interesting. The patriarch of the OCG has a lot of influence and is 
according to opinion polls the most trusted and most popular public figure in Georgia. Since its 
independence in 1991 the OCG has meant a lot for state building and nationalism in Georgia. Even 
though the church is loyal to the state it has in the last years been critical on laws they say would 
promote liberal values. The influence of the OCG is hard to overestimate. They are able to influence 
the law-making process and have a lot of support among the Georgian people.  
 
A problem I encountered in this research is that in Russia and Georgia the state is so intertwined 
with the church and the church is so important in the identity of the nation that it is hard to say what 
would have happened in this conflict without the Orthodox Church. The ROC and OCG are not only 
churches, not only faiths, but they are also the identity of the state and the nation. The church is an 
important factor for both the nation and the state, since a large part of the nation identifies as part 
of the church and the state has to consider the position of the church when making laws or releasing 
statements on topic the church might not agree with. At the same time the church needs the state 
to ensure its material possessions and as a ‘tool’ to strengthen Orthodoxy in the country. Finally the 
nation is part of both state and church, unless one of these two loses the support of the nation. That 
is also why state and church are so closely aligned, because the idea behind the ‘symphony’ between 
church and state is that they’re supposed to strengthen each other.  
 
It is a significant factor that in both countries the Orthodox faith is an important part of the history 
of the state. Russia sees the baptism of Vladimir in 988 as an important point in the coming to be of 
Russia, while Orthodoxy in Georgia goes back to the fourth century when St. Nino is believed to have 
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converted the country. This means that the history of Orthodoxy is long, and more importantly, the 
perception on this history in Russia and Georgia suggests is ingrained in the national identity. In the 
post-Soviet period this idea has been brought back successfully, witnessing the large number of 
Russians and Georgians that identify as Orthodox now. Where the rise of nationalism in the 
nineteenth century in Western Europe was accompanied by a separation of church and state, in 
Eastern Europe it lead to an even closer entanglement of church, state and nation. It is remarkable 
that even the period of communism could not change this.  
 
It is hard to tell how much influence the leaders of these churches had on the conflict between 
Russia and Georgia. After all, the war did happen despite their calls for peace so it is clear their calls 
were ultimately not decisive. Nonetheless, they played a significant role, especially in the reaching of 
a ceasefire agreement and in the aftermath. They were largely responsible for creating a perspective 
in their country that their war was not necessarily just and right. But that it was a war that should 
not take place, because Russians and Georgians are ‘people of the same faith’. This helped creating 
an environment in which it was easier to end the war and to come to an agreement. The 
emphasizing of the cultural proximity between the countries, the calls for peace, the denial of 
violence and the focus on brotherhood by both churches prevented the countries from completely 
alienating themselves and each other.  
 
The role of the ROC and OCG can also be deemed important because of the practical possibilities it 
offered. After Georgia broke off all diplomatic contacts with Russia, the Orthodox church 
transformed into the main diplomatic channel. This channel offered political leaders a low profile 
way of maintaining diplomacy. At the same time church leaders played a significant role. It was 
shortly after the conflict that Ilia II had to travel to Russia for the funeral of his colleague Patriarch 
Alexey II and conveyed a message of Saakashvili to Russian president Medvedev. For a political 
leader a meeting so soon after a war might have meant a loss of face, when a church leader does it, 
it is a hope for reconciliation. 
 
At the same time during this period the churches maintained relative friendly relations and because 
of canon law this could not escalate. The ROC still supported the OCG’s claim that Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia were part of its Patriarchate, even though at the same time they supported Russia’s 
claim that the people in these breakaway regions had the right to be protected. By this attitude a 
provocation and a theological dispute was prevented and the churches could find agreement in a 
joint call for peace.  
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The role of the Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe is only emphasized by the fact that most states, 
including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have been trying to have their own church recognized. For 
that reason, the positive influence the Orthodox Church has in state-building more research. The 
revived and continuing significance of the Orthodox churches in the post-soviet time suggest that it 
might hold this imporant position for a long time to come. Fostering better relations between 
Georgia and Russia might yet be one of the greatest tasks of Orthodoxy, but it is doubtful if the close 
relations with the state will ever let the church achieve that. 
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